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Group Vilification Reconsidered
The attempts by the Nazi Party of America to march in Skokie,
Illinois,' afford a recent example of the public dissemination of speech
that vilifies large and identifiable racial, ethnic, or religious groups.
2
Thirty years ago, the question of whether such speech should enjoy
First Amendment protection was hotly debated among legal scholars,
3
and in 1952 a sharply divided Supreme Court held in Beauharnais v.
Illinois4 that such speech should not be protected. 5 Interest in the
1. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. ILL.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373
N.E.2d 21 (1978).
2. "Vilifying" speech has been defined as any utterance that, directly or by innuendo,
holds up the target of the utterance to "public contempt, hatred, shame, disgrace, or
obloquy," or that causes the target or its members to be "shunned, avoided or injured"
in business, profession or occupation. Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 609 (1947); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). The
terms "group-vilifying speech" and "group vilification" will be used in this Note to
signify speech that vilifies large and identifiable racial, ethnic, or religious groups.
The particular speech circulated in the Village of Skokie focused on Jews as its target
group. See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 680-81 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Enclosures in Letter from Harvey Schwartz,
Corporation Counsel, Village of Skokie (Oct. 25, 1978) (circulars entitled "Smash the Jew
System," "We Are Coming") (on file with Yale Law Journal). Jews and blacks are fre-
quently the object of group-vilifying speech. See Enclosures in Letter from Miriam
Aroner, Librarian, American Jewish Congress, New York City (Dec. 20, 1978) (circulars
entitled "Washington's America Sabotaged by Jews," "Scientists Say Negro Still In Ape
Stage") (on file with Yale Law Journal); Enclosures in Letter from Dr. Henry Pohly,
Community Consultant, New York Regional Office, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith (Dec. 19, 1978) (circulars entitled "Jewish Cabal Rules America," "Instant Nigger")
(on file with Yale Law Journal).
3. The seminal article, Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel,
42 COLUM. L. REv. 727 (1942), provoked considerable response and debate. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE CASE AGAINST LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL LIBELS
AND ANONYMOUS PUBLICATIONS (1946); Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261
(1950); Note, Group Libel Laws: Abortive Efforts to Combat Hate Propaganda, 61 YALE
L.J. 252 (1952); Note, supra note 2.
4. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
5. Id. at 266. Beauharnais was convicted under an Illinois statute that prohibited any
person from publishing:
any lithograph ... [that] portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue
of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication...
exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots.
Id. at 251 (quoting Act of June 29, 1917, Ill. Criminal Code, § 224a, 1917 Il. Laws 362-63
(repealed 1962)). The lithograph complained of was a leaflet in the form of a petition
that demanded that the Mayor and City Council of Chicago "halt the further encroach-
ment, harassment and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and per-
sons, by the Negro." The leaflet added that, "If persuasion and the need to prevent the
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subject has waned in the intervening years,6 but many scholars and
jurists have come to assume-despite Beauharnais-that group-vilifying
speech cannot constitutionally be proscribed.7
This Note challenges that assumption. It contends that there exists
a readily discernible category of group-vilifying speech that can be
prohibited by criminal statute without infringing the First Amend-
ment. The Note argues that the categories of speech held to lie outside
the protection of the First Amendment share common characteristics
that account for and justify their nonprotected status. By applying this
analysis to the speech-category of group vilification, the Note defines a
subcategory-termed "group defamation"-that can constitutionally be
prohibited as a crime.
I. Group Vilification Defined
At common law, the libel of large groups was held to have no remedy.
However, the psychological assumptions underlying that rule do not
hold true with respect to a particular subcategory of group libel, group
vilification.
A. The Traditional Concept of Group Libel
Like the ordinary libel of an individual, speech that libels a large
group involves three parties: the speaker, the hearer, and the target.8
white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions
.. . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will." Id. at 252.
Beauharnais claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment. He also argued that
the statute was too vague to support a criminal conviction. In an opinion of Justice
Frankfurter, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by a 5-4 vote.
6. Since 1952 only six major pieces have addressed the subject: Arkes, Civility and the
Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 281;
Beth, Group Libel and Free Speech, 39 MINN. L. RaV. 167 (1955); Brown & Stern, Group
Defamation in the U.S.A., 13 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rav. 7 (1964); Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free
Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. Ray. 295 (1958); Pemberton, Can the Law Provide a Remedy for
Race Defamation in the United States? 14 N.Y.L.F. 33 (1968); Comment, Race Defamation
and the First Amendment, 34 FORDHAM L. Rrv. 653 (1966).
7. A number of judicial opinions have assumed that the Beauharnais holding is no
longer good law, even though it has never been overruled. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 390 (1969) (Wright, J.,
concurring); United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1277-78 (D. Md. 1974). Similarly,
the House Judiciary Committee Staff, examining the possibility of federal group-libel
legislation in 1963, expressed "serious doubt respecting the [Beauharnais] decision's im-
portance as precedent." STAFF OF HOUSE COMs. ON JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SEss., RE-
PORT ON PROPOSED FEDERAL GROUP LIBEL LEGISLATION 10 (Comm. Print 1963); cf. Arkes,
supra note 6, at 284 ("Among 'professional' civil libertarians, the concept [of proscribing
group vilification] is treated as an anachronism, and its general disuse in recent years is
taken as a sign of its ultimate inaptness in our constitutional law.")
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558(a)-558(c) (1977); W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971).
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As early as 1699, however, the common law distinguished between
ordinary libel and group libel: 9 words that would be libelous if directed
against an individual were held not actionable when directed against
a group of any appreciable size. 10 That rule has carried down to
present-day American law virtually intact.'
The theory of the common-law rule against group-libel actions is
that the gravamen of such an action must be individual harm, and that
as the target group increases in size, the harmful effect of the statement
on any individual member must be diluted, until at some point the
harm falls below the threshold of legal recognition.'
-2 To be plausible,
this theory requires the positing of a determinedly rationalistic, even
mechanical, model of the human psyche. Such a model supposes that
the hearer of a group-libelous statement always treats that statement
rationally: in other words, that the hearer does not allow the statement
to affect his estimation of an individual member of the target group
without reasonable grounds to believe that the general statement holds
true for the particular individual. Given this supposition, the model
leads to a belief that individual harm cannot occur as the result of a
group-libelous statement, because the hearer of the statement will make
the rational assessment that such a statement is, by its nature, less likely
to be true with respect to every member of a large group than it is to
be true with respect to a particular individual. The model thus con-
cludes that the hearer will discount the statement according to the size
9. As used in this Note, the term "group libel" will refer to any vilifying speech, see
note 2 supra, that takes as its target a large and identifiable group of people. Where the
target group is identifiable because of some racial, ethnic, or religious distinction, the
vilifying speech will be referred to as "group vilification." Group vilification is thus a
subset of group libel. An example of vilifying speech that constitutes group libel but not
group vilification can be found in Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(employees of department store accused of sexual crimes and deviations).
10. See The King v. Alme & Nott, 3 Salk. 224, 91 Eng. Rep. 790 (1699) ("Where a
writing . . . inveighs against mankind in general, or against a particular order of men,
as for instance, men of the gown, this is no libel, but it must descend to particulars and
individuals to make it a libel.") A somewhat different and more extensive account of the
same case is given by Lord Raymond, in Rex v. Orme & Nutt, 1 Ld. Raym. 486, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1224 (1699).
11. See Tanenhaus, sutra note 3, at 267-71 (arguing that present American law
developed as result of misunderstanding of Alme & Nott holding); Comment, supra note
6, at 654-59 (same). The present interpretation is firmly established, not only with respect
to criminal prosecutions, see, e.g., People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d
257, 268 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938), but also with respect to civil actions, see, e.g., Arcand V.
Evening Call Publishing Co., 567 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1977); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13
F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Tanenhaus, suPra note 3, at 263-65. But see id. at 272 (dis-
cerning "general if somewhat erratic trend" towards affording "protection to groups of
ever-increasing size").
12. See Arcand v. Evening Call Publishing Co., 567 F.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Ist Cir. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A, Comments a, b at 168 (1977); Comment, supra
note 6, at 659.
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of the target group, and that he will be influenced in his subsequent
dealings with individual members of the group only to this fractional,
discounted extent.1 3
Such a psychological model may be credible with respect to the
libeling of some kinds of target groups.' 4 But when libelous speech
takes as its target a racial, ethnic, or religious group, the credibility of
that model becomes extremely doubtful. Often, the hearer of such
speech is already prejudiced 3 against the target group, because group-
vilifying speakers generally focus on precisely those racial, ethnic, and
religious groups against which their hearers already hold widespread
prejudices.'" In short, the group-vilifying speaker rarely tells his hearers
anything new to them. He merely reinforces and plays upon their old
prejudices.1' In such cases, the justification for the common-law rule
13. Prosser observes that civil libel actions are generally barred when the target group
exceeds 25 persons, because in the absence of special circumstances no plaintiff can
establish a sufficient personal reference to himself. W. PROSSER, sukra note 8, at 750. But
"[w]hen the group becomes smaller than that, . . . the courts have been willing to permit
the conclusion that the finger of defamation is pointed at each individual" to a degree
sufficient to support the suit. Id. at 750-51 (footnotes omitted).
14. See, e.g., Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The defendants
had published in a book the charge that "some" of the models and salesgirls in the
plaintiff's department store had often served as call girls, and that "most" of the salesmen
were homosexuals. All 9 of the models, 15 of the 25 salesmen, and 30 of the 382 sales-
women brought suit. The defendants did not contest the models' suit, but moved to
dismiss the salesmen's and saleswomen's complaints. As to the former, the court rejected
the defendants' motion, observing that the group was fairly small and that the allegation
had been directed at "most" of the group. Id. at 316. As to the latter, however, the court
accepted the defendants' motion, and dismissed the suit. Id. It noted the large size of the
saleswomen's group, and concluded that "no reasonable man would . .. conclude from
the publication a reference to any individual saleswoman." Id.
15. Prejudice has been defined as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible
generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole,
or toward an individual because he is a member of that group." G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE
OF PREJUDICE 10 (1954).
16. G. ALLPORT, ABC's OF SCAPEGOATING 29 (3d ed. 1959) (victim usually someone
who has been traditional object of blame); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair
Game and Fair Comment 1, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (1942) (weaker groups usually
selected as targets of group-vilifying speech).
17. See G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 142-64 (4th ed. 1972). The authors describe a "field con-
text of discrimination," in which prejudice leads to acts of discrimination, which in turn
lead to structured social inequalities betweeni majority and minority groups. These in-
equalities, spurred by economic and political conflict between majority and minority
groups, lead to reinforcement of existing prejudices and, consequently, further acts of
discrimination, at which point the cycle begins anew. Id. at 157. An integral part of this.vicious circle," id. at 156, the maintenance of "traditions of prejudice" and "stereotypes,"
is achieved, the authors contend, primarily by verbal means. Through the jokes and off-
hand remarks of his peers, as well as the "more serious conversations of adults," the child
is introduced to the prejudices of his group, and gradually "socialized" to its norms of
behavior. Id. at 161; see G. ALLPoRT, subra note 16, at 16-25; G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA 101-06 (1944). This Note contends that group-vilifying speech is the adult
analogue to the "socialization" speech of childhood: whereas the latter introduced the
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limiting group-libel actions depends for its persuasiveness on the ex-
tent to which prejudices against racial, ethnic, and religious groups are
held rationally. For if such prejudices are not held rationally, then the
common-law rule's psychological model, which assumes a rational
hearer, rests on a badly flawed initial assumption.
B. Group Vilification Distinguished from Group Libel
The nature of prejudicial beliefs has been the subject of extensive
research during the past thirty years. Although these studies are not
definitive, they cast substantial doubt on the justification for the
common-law strictures against all group-libel actions.'
8 A number of
social scientists have concluded that the capacity of prejudiced people
to evaluate new information rationally, and to reason coherently in gen-
eral, is substantially less than that of their more tolerant peers.'
9 This
conclusion buttresses the findings of the many psychological studies
indicating that prejudicial beliefs are largely the product of sub-
conscious stresses and conflicts, and are therefore beyond the conscious,
rational control of their holders.20 Thus the psychological model be-
hind the common-law limits on group-libel actions is inapposite when
vilifying speech is directed at a target group against which the hearer
hearer to his prejudices, the former reminds him of them, both reinforcing overt pre-
judices and making latent ones overt. Cf. G. MYRDAL, supra, at 102 (racial prejudices in
America are strengthened by tradition and community consensus, and concocted for op-
portunistic purposes by "unscrupulous demagogues").
18. It might be argued that nondefinitive studies cannot provide a state legislature
with reasonable grounds for proscribing group-vilifying speech, but that argument is in-
sufficient. The same argument was made during the debate over prohibiting obscene
speech, see, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 510-11 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and the controlling obscenity
opinions repeatedly rejected it, see, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-63
(1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968); cf. Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 501-02 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in Alberts v. California, a consolidated case)
(discussing issue at length).
19. See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, supra note 15, at 170-71 (cognitive processes of prejudiced
people differ from cognitive processes of tolerant people; difference consists of propensity
for "two-valued judgments," and "rigid ... habits of thought," as well as "marked need
for definiteness"); Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, g- Chein, Prejudice and Ethnic Relations,
in 5 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOCY 1, 36-37 (2d ed. E. Aronson & G. Lindzey eds. 1969)
(reviewing studies that discerned greater "intoleran[ce] of ambiguity," poorer "ability to
reason logically," and poorer ability to deal with "abstract ideas" among high-prejudice
subjects than among low-prejudice subjects).
20. See, e.g., G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, supra note 17, at 70-75 (reviewing studies attri-
buting prejudice to the projection of subconscious anxieties); Harding, Kutner, Proshan-
sky, & Chein, Prejudice and Ethnic Relations, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1021,
1044 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954) (reviewing psychological research that concluded that "the
prejudiced person attempts to protect himself from the recognition of his own unac-




is already prejudiced. In such conditions, group-vilifying speech often
evokes from its hearers a response that is increased, rather than dimin-
ished, by the breadth of its accusations. 21 Furthermore, because pre-
judicial beliefs are subconsciously motivated, they may be aroused and
reinforced by way of the subconscious. Several examinations of the
nature of group-vilifying speech and its effects on prejudiced hearers
have concluded that often this is precisely what happens: group-
vilifying speech can, and often does, gain acceptance subconsciously,
without the hearer ever consciously or rationally deliberating over the
content of the speech.22 In other words, owing to the character of its
hearers, group vilification generally enjoys a greater measure of per-
suasiveness than does ordinary group libel.
These differences suggest that the magnitude of harm to be ex-
pected from group-vilifying speech may be substantially greater than
from other types of group libel.23 Although this harm is usually suf-
fered by the members of the target group as individuals, 24 the target
21. Professor Arkes has noted:
[A] libel directed at a group may defame no less because it is directed at the group
as a whole .... []n fact, it may defame even more, because it sweeps with a broader
brush .... [This] argument would be impossible to reject unless one were also willing
to reject the proposition that certain minority groups in this country have in fact
suffered injuries in the past as a result of racist stereotypes that have been perpetuated
in the public mind.
Arkes, supra note 6, at 292. Professor Riesman advances a similar view:
[WV]here the [speaker] is engaged in exploiting the anxieties or the sadism of his
[hearers], and can count on built-in prejudice, he may increase his credibility as he
increases the scope and violence of his lies. The more daring the lie, the more simple
it is to comprehend, the more satisfying as an "explanation," and the more impressive
the speaker-if the political and social context provide fuel, and the object of the lies
is already held in fear and suspicion.
Riesman, supra note 3, at 770 (footnote omitted).
22. This is so because group-vilifying speech directly addresses the subconscious needs
of the overtly or latently prejudiced hearer, including the needs to externalize self-hatred
and anxiety, to project repressed desires, and to stereotype the target group in order to
avoid uncertainty. See G. ALLPORT, supra note 15, at 393. In this sense, group-vilifying
speech serves as an emotional crutch to the overtly or latently prejudiced hearer, and he
frequently accepts it as such. See L. LOWENTHAL & N. GUTERMAN, PROPHETS OF DECEIT 10,
16, 76, 139 (1949); Ackerman & Jahoda, The Dynamic Basis of Anti-Semitic Attitudes,
17 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 240, 260 (1948). Thus
the distinction between the manifest and latent meaning of [a group-vilifying] text
must be seen as crucial. Taken at their face value, [such] texts seem merely as in-
dulgence in futile furies about vague disturbances. Translated into their psychological
equivalents, [such] texts are seen as consistent, meaningful, and significantly related
to the social world.
L. LOWENTHAL & N. GUTERMAN, supra, at 140; see A. LEE & E. LEE, THE FINE ART OF
PROPAGANDA 22-131 (1939); Riesman, supra note 3, at 729 & n.16.
23. To the extent that group vilification has the effect of reinforcing latent and overt
prejudices in the minds of its hearers, the target group is harmed by a subsequent in-
crease in the degree of discrimination imposed by those hearers. See note 17 supra.
24. See Arkes, supra note 6, at 292; Riesman, supra note 3, at 731.
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group as a whole is also frequently harmed. When discrimination in-
creases, the effectiveness of the group's participation in public affairs
may be hampered.2 5 Finally, some studies suggest that continued vili-
fication, combined with the ensuing discrimination, may cause in-
dividual members of the target group to develop lower levels of self-
esteem, and higher levels of repressed aggressiveness, than they other-
wise would.
2 6
The nature of the harms that can be caused by group vilification
renders this kind of speech a fit subject for state concern. Although
the target group and its members are the most direct victims of group
vilification, the general public also suffers harm when group-vilifying
speech is disseminated. Such speech contributes to the creation and
maintenance of prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory behavior
throughout American society.27 The courts and Congress have recog-
nized a public interest in the elimination of discrimination.2 8 It follows
that in the absence of First Amendment considerations, the state and
federal governments would clearly be able to regulate group vilifica-
tion, owing to its encouragement of behavior strongly contrary to public
policy.2
9
25. See Riesman, supra note 3, at 731.
26. The traditional view in this regard has been that members of target groups,
particularly blacks, internalized the hostility of the dominant group. This accepted self-
hatred then manifested itself in various ways, both psychological and physical. See, e.g.,
A. KARDINER & L. Ov.sEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION 301-87 (1951); Adams, Segregation-
Integration: Patterns of Culture and Social Adjustment, 28 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 14,
14-20 (1958); Brown & Stern, supra note 6, at 25-29; Riesman, supra note 3, at 771. This
view has recently been challenged, especially with respect to blacks. See, e.g., E. BAUGHMAN,
BLACK AMERICANs, A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 37-55 (1971). In particular, the "Black
Power" movement is seen as having tended to counteract whatever internalization effects
had previously taken place among blacks. See Pinderhughes, Racism and Psychotherapy,
in RACISM AND MENTAL HEALTH 61, 85 (C. Willie, B. Kramer, & B. Brown eds. 1973).
27. See note 17 supra.
28. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment of the Court); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977). Indeed, the Supreme Court has become so solicitous of the public
interest in eliminating discrimination that it has granted to the white tenants of a non-
integrated apartment complex standing to sue privately under § 810(a) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976). Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972). For examples of congressional recognition of this same public interest, see
Titles II-IV, VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, .q 201-07, 301-04,
401-10, 701-16, 78 Stat. 243-49, 253-66 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000c, 2000e (1976))
(prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, public facilities, public education,
and employment opportunities); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 83 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976)) (prohibiting discrimination
in sale or rental of housing).
29. Private causes of action, by whomever brought, have generally been recognized as
impractical. See, e.g., Beth, supra note 6, at 182; Note, supra note 3, at 261-63. Under
such circumstances, government intervention has been recognized as appropriate. See
Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974) (affirming city ordinance
prohibiting use of "For Sale" signs in residential neighborhoods).
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II. Unprotected Speech and Group Vilification
Because the vulnerability of group vilification to governmental
regulation depends on the extent to which such speech enjoys the pro-
tection of the First Amendment, it is necessary to examine the various
categories of speech that are already recognized as unprotected by the
First Amendment. This examination reveals within those categories
common characteristics-termed "indicia of nonprotection"-that mani-
fest some of the accepted borders of the First Amendment.
A. Unprotected Categories of Speech and Their Common
Characteristics
The Court has identified three categories of speech that fall outside
the protection of the First Amendment: "fighting words," as described
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire;30 "incitement to riot," as illustrated
by Feiner v. New York; 31 and obscenity, as defined in Roth v. United
States32 and its progeny.33 Each of these three unprotected categories
of speech was defined separately by the Court, with a seemingly dis-
tinct rationale for nonprotection. Yet in central respects, the three
rationales overlap.
The essential attribute of "fighting words" is that the words elicit
from the hearer an automatic, undeliberated response likely to lead to
a breach of the peace.34 Such utterances, the Chaplinsky Court said,
30. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
31. 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
32. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
33. See, e.g., Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 296-305 (1978); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 20-26 (1973); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 686-90 (1959).
34. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky was con-
victed of violating a New Hampshire statute that provided that "'No person shall ad-
dress any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in
any street or other public place, nor call him any offensive or derisive name .... ' Id.
at 569 (quoting 1926 PUB. LAws N.H., ch. 378, § 2, 1885 N.H. Laws 274 (current version
at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570:2 (Supp. 1973))). The violation occurred on a public street
when Chaplinsky said to a police officer, "You are a God damned racketeer," and "a
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."
Id. Chaplinsky's claim that the statute unconstitutionally infringed his First Amendment
rights was rejected by the Court:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted). The statute under which Chaplinsky was convicted went
to the Supreme Court "authoritatively construed" and narrowed by the New Hampshire
315
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"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity."35 Although recent memorandum opinions of the Supreme Court
indicate that the unprotected category of "fighting words" may be
narrowed in future holdings,36 the existence of "fighting words" as an
unprotected category of speech has not been judicially doubted. In-
deed, the rationale of the Chaplinsky holding has been approved in
recent cases.
3 7
Similarly, the gravamen of the offense of "incitement to riot" is that
incitement "passes the bounds of argument or persuasion." 38 As the
Feiner Court recognized, the inciting speaker seeks to "arouse '' 39 one
group against another, and succeeds so well that "a clear danger of
disorder [is] . . . threatened. ' 40 Although the Court today may define
this category more narrowly than did the Feiner Court, the existence
of the category is still recognized.
41
Supreme Court. Id. at 572. According to that construction, no words were forbidden by
the statute
except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed . . . .Derisive and annoying words can
be taken as coming within the purview of the statute ...only when they have this
characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace.
Id. at 573.
35. Id. at 572 (paraphrasing and citing Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
150 (1941)). Chafee further observed that "[w]ords of this type offer little opportunity for
the usual process of counter-argument. The harm is done as soon as they are com-
municated, or is liable to follow almost immediately in the form of retaliatory violence."
Z. CHAFEE, suttra, at 150.
36. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 257 La. 993, 244 So. 2d 860 (1971), vacated
and remanded mem., 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (refusing to review conviction for calling police
officer, "'g- d- m - f---f '"); New Jersey v. Rosenfeld, 59 N.J. 435, 283
A.2d 535 (1971), vacated and remanded mem., 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (refusing to review con-
viction for use of words, "'im f- '" by speaker at public school board
meeting, to describe teachers, school board, town, and "his own country").
37. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (separate opinion of
Stevens, J.); id. at 756 (separate opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 763 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972).
38. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951). Feiner was convicted of dis.
orderly conduct after making a speech on a street corner in Syracuse, New York. His
speech "gave the impression that he was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against
the whites, urging that they rise up in arms and fight for equal rights." Id. at 317. The
Court found that some of Feiner's audience "appeared to be favoring [his] arguments," id.,
and that consequently "a clear danger of disorder was threatened," id. at 319. The Court
held that Feiner had "passe[d] the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertake[n]
incitement to riot," id. at 321; that "the principle of freedom of speech [does not sanctionl
incitement to riot," id. at 320; and that therefore Feiner's conviction did not abridge his
First Amendment rights, id. at 321.
39. Id. at 317.
40. Id. at 319.
41. See, e.g., Benson v. Rich, 448 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.E. 978
(1972) (Indian youth's rights not infringed when tribal officials prevented his distribution
of inflammatory leaflets during Indian Ceremonial).
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Finally, the distinguishing characteristic of "obscenity" is that such
speech, taken as a whole, appeals to the "prurient interest" in sex.42 In
addition, under current law speech must be found "patently offensive,"
and devoid of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," 43
in order to be deemed obscene. The contours of this category of speech
have changed at times,4 4 but the existence of the category is un-
doubted.
4 5
The rationales for the nonprotection of these three categories of
speech are quite similar in two central respects. Each category con-
tains only speech that threatens serious harm to some substantial public
interest.40 In addition, each category includes only speech that by-
42. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). Roth was convicted under a
federal statute that declared "[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet,
picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character," as
well as every advertisement for such material, to be nonmailable matter. Id. at 479 n.1
(quoting Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1461, 62 Stat. 768 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1976))). Roth argued that the statute violated the First Amendment. The Court
observed that
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social im-
portance.
Id. at 484 (footnote omitted). The Court thus held that "obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id. at 485. It went on to observe that the
"portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason
to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press." Id. at
487 (footnote omitted). Only material the "dominant theme" of which, "taken as a
whole," appealed "to prurient interest" in sex, was defined as within the unprotected
category. Id. at 489 (footnote omitted). The "prurient interest" test remains in the Court's
current definition of obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
43. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
44. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (requiring speech to be
"utterly without redeeming social value" in order to be deemed obscene).
45. See, e.g., Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 296-305 (1978).
46. The interest harmed by "fighting words" is the public interest in the public
peace. The unprotected category contains only such words as have the characteristic of
plainly tending to cause "a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 573 (1942). The same public interest is threatened by "incitement to riot." Speech
falls into this category only when it clearly threatens disorder. See Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 319 (1951); Benson v. Rich, 448 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 978 (1972). Obscenity harms two different public interests. First, there is "at least
an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime." Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). Second, there is "the interest of the public in the quality
of life and the total community environment." Id. The category of "obscenity" is defined
so as to include only speech that threatens these interests. The "prurient interest" re-
quirement speaks to the first, and the "patent offensiveness" requirement speaks to the
second. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 73-74 (1975).
It should be noted that a "serious harm to substantial public interests" sufficient to
warrant the nonprotection of speech can be caused in either of two ways. If speech poses
a "clear and present danger" of some "substantive evils"-for example, breach of the
peace-then that harm is considered sufficient to render speech unprotected. Schenck v.
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passes the conscious faculties of its hearer in some way.47 Thus each
category describes a kind of speech that not only causes harm, but does
so in such a way that it cannot be effectively counteracted by opposing
speech. 48 By denying protection in Chaplinsky, Feiner, and the ob-
scenity cases, the Court appears to have indicated that when speech
exhibits these two indicia of nonprotection-that is, when speech both
by-passes the conscious faculties of its hearers and threatens serious
harm to substantial public interests-then the claim of that speech to
the protection of the First Amendment falls to its lowest ebb. It thus
appears that in the absence of countervailing considerations, speech
possessing these two characteristics may be prohibited without con-
travening the First Amendment.
The holdings in Chaplinsky, Feiner, and the obscenity cases are not
sufficiently explicit, in themselves, to warrant the conclusion that these
indicia of nonprotection were indeed the characteristics of the speech
at issue that led the Court to deny protection. Moreover, those holdings
were sufficiently narrow that it is not possible, without further in-
vestigation, to assume that their rationales can be applied to other, dif-
ferent categories of speech such as group vilification. Accordingly, it is
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). This is the type of harm threatened by fighting
words and incitement to riot. But speech may also threaten "substantive evils" in a
slower, more cumulative manner. The obscenity holdings indicate that this sort of harm
can also be considered sufficient to render speech unprotected, if the magnitude of the
harm is great enough. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-60 (1973). In
addition, this latter sort of harm can be established without proving a direct causal link
between particular acts of speech and particular incidents of harm. Id. at 60-64. Such a
direct link must be shown when the harm involved is of the "clear and present danger"
sort. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
47. The term "conscious faculties" will be used to describe that capacity, within the
hearer's mind, that evaluates information, weighs contrary claims and arguments, and
decides how to respond to appeals to action, in a manner of which the hearer is aware.
Such faculties are distinct from and opposed to the capacity within the hearer for
spontaneous, unreflective, emotional reaction.
Although fighting words, incitement to riot and obscenity arise in very different social
contexts, each kind of speech, by definition, by-passes the conscious faculties of its hearer.
Speech is punishable as fighting words only "when [it has] -this characteristic of plainly
tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (emphasis added). Similarly, speech falls into the unprotected
category of incitement to riot only when it "passes the bounds of argument or persuasion,"
and seeks with some success to "arouse" hearers to action against others. Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315, 321, 317 (1951). Finally, speech only becomes obscene when, rather than
conveying an idea, it appeals to a "prurient interest" in sex. Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484, 489 (1957). The Roth Court perceived "prurient interest" to be an in-
stinctual, undeliberated desire. See id. at 487 n.20.
48. Professor Chafee, whose analysis of the fighting-words category was endorsed and
cited by the Chaplinsky Court, 315 U.S. at 572 nn. 4, 5, discussed the nonprotection of
obscenity and incitements to riot as well. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 35, at 149-52. He con-
cluded that "the true explanation" for the denial of protection to these kinds of speech
was the same as that for the denial of protection to fighting words. Id.
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necessary to identify the theory of First Amendment rights that under-
lies these holdings.
B. An Underlying Theory of First Amendment Rights
The exact intentions of the authors of the First Amendment are not
made plain by the available historical evidence,49 but in recent years a
number of free-speech theorists have offered a variety of rationales for
the special place afforded to speech by the Constitution." One of these
writers was Alexander Meiklejohn. According to Meiklejohn's view,
the right to free speech is derived from and required by the principles
of self-government. The right of the public to govern itself requires
that the public be permitted to receive all information that might
affect its collective decisions. This requirement in turn demands free
speech.51 By necessary implication, the only speech that must without
question receive protection on this view is speech that can be delib-
erated upon by the public. Speech that goes beyond the presentation
of ideas for public consideration and deliberation need not be per-
mitted, because such speech is not relevant to the process of deliberative
consent and self-government from which the right to speak derives.52
49. It has been argued that the authors were "merely denying the power of Congress
to legislate in this area, leaving to the states the power to restrain speech as they saw
fit." Kelly, subra note 6, at 308 (footnote omitted). It has also been contended that the
authors had no intentions at all, except the pragmatic ones of "allaying popular fears"
and securing the ratification of the Constitution. L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 225-26
(1960).
50. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); A. MEIKLE-
JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
51. A. NfEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50, at 1-27. This approach is also taken by other First
Amendment theorists. See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. 8 PUB.
AFFAIRS 204, 206-22 (1972); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971). Professor Emerson's theory of First Amendment rights,
by contrast, posits four different purposes for expression, two of which-expression "as a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment," and as a means of "achieving a more
adaptable and hence a more stable community"-cannot be derived from the principle of
self-government. T. EMERSON, supra note 50, at 6-7 (paraphrasing Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Professor Bork has observed, with
respect to the "self-fulfillment" purpose posited by Emerson, that speech possessing this
attribute alone is "indistinguishable from . . . all other human activity" that promotes
self-fulfillment. He therefore concludes that "the principled judge ... cannot, on neutral
grounds, choose to protect speech that has only [this attribute] more than he protects any
other claimed freedom." Bork, supra, at 25. As for the "stable community" purpose
posited by Emerson, Bork argues that the decision whether to repress speech that has
only this purpose is properly seen as a political one. He thus conceives that such speech
should depend for its protection on the political branches of government, rather than on
the courts. Id.
52. The rationale behind this view is as follows: A state organized on the principle of
self-government rests the moral legitimacy of its collective actions on the proposition that
a majority of its citizens have freely arrived at an individual opinion supporting those
actions. This means that with respect to all issues requiring collective decision and
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Some other First Amendment theorists have agreed with Meiklejohn
to this extent, but have then interpreted the process of self-government
narrowly. Consequently, these theorists have prescribed a restriction of
the protection of the First Amendment to "explicitly political" speech
alone.53 Meiklejohn took a broader view, conceiving the right to "self-
government" to include a collective right to self-determination not only
in the political sphere, but in the cultural and moral spheres as well.
Accordingly, the Meiklejohnian view extends the protection of the
First Amendment beyond explicitly political speech, to speech relevant
to the public's concern with "philosophy," as well as "[1]iterature and
the arts." 54
The indicia of nonprotection, as discerned above and applied by the
Supreme Court, closely reflect the Meiklejohnian theory of First
Amendment rights. The first indicium relates the nonprotection of
certain speech to the fact that it by-passes the conscious faculties of its
hearers. When speech possesses this characteristic, it cannot be delib-
erated upon by its hearers, and therefore cannot play any meaningful
role in the process of deliberative public decisionmaking that, under
the Meiklejohnian view, alone justifies special protection for speech.
Thus the significance attached to this indicium suggests an acceptance
by the Court of the central premise of the Meiklejohnian theory. The
second essential indicium requires a showing of substantial harm be-
fore the conclusion is permitted that speech is unprotected. The fact
that this indicium is deemed necessary to a determination of nonpro-
tection means that all relatively harmless acts of self-expression and
self-promotion will be protected; thus the emphasis placed on this in-
dicium implies the adoption by the Court of a relatively broad view
of the process of self-government, a view that embraces cultural and
moral, as well as political, self-determination. This view coincides with
that required by the Meiklejohnian theory.
Thus it may be inferred that the Supreme Court, in its Chaplinsky,
Feiner, and obscenity holdings, has employed principles of decision
action, the state must allow its citizens to arrive at their individual opinions freely. In a
state so organized, certain kinds of speech-those by-passing the deliberative faculty-
cannot consistently be permitted. Suppose, for example, a state where incitement to riot
were permitted speech. In such a society, collective actions would sometimes be taken as
a result of such incitements. But such collective actions would not have been taken as a
result of citizens freely arriving at individual opinions supporting those actions. There-
fore, that state would not be observing the principle of self-government.
53. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 51, at 28.
54. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245, 257; cf. Scanlon, supra note 51, at 215-22 (prescribing similar extension of First
Amendment protection for speech, based on concept of individual autonomy).
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essentially identical to the Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment
rights. A review of numerous other Supreme Court opinions that dis-
cuss the nature of protected speech suggests that the employment of
this view by the Supreme Court is not confined to cases involving
fighting words, incitement to riot, and obscenity alone, but rather that
this view represents the attitude of the Court towards First Amendment
cases in general. A number of cases that examine the general nature of
protected speech confer unqualified protection only on speech per-
taining to the interchange of ideas by means of discussion.5 The
rationale of these cases plainly rests on principles functionally equiv-
alent to those embodied in the Meiklejohnian theory. These general
endorsements of that theory are underscored by the specific holdings
in two First Amendment cases, Kingsley International Pictures Corpo-
ration v. Regents of the University of the State of New York,56 and
Brandenburg v. Ohio.57 These opinions envision speech as absolutely
protected whenever it contributes to the deliberative process of public
decisionmaking5 By contrast, other categories of speech may be pro-
55. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas.") (footnote omitted); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940) ("Abridgement of the liberty [of speech] can be justified only
where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no op-
portunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of
public opinion.") (footnote omitted).
56. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
57. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
58. Kingsley involved speech tending to encourage "sexual immorality." Thus the
effect feared from this speech closely resembled that feared from the obscene speech held
unprotected in Roth and subsequent cases. Compare Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1959) (motion picture recognized as
alluringly portraying adultery as proper behavior) with Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 58-60 (1973) (obscenity seen as adversely affecting the style and quality of
community life). Similarly, Brandenburg involved speech tending to encourage the use
of violence by one racial group against another, much like the speech successfully
punished in Feiner. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 & n.1 (1969) (speech
urging violence against Jews and blacks) with Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317
(1951) (speech urging Negroes to "rise up in arms and fight"). But despite these similari-
ties in feared effect, the speech at issue in Kinglsey and Brandenburg was held protected
by the First Amendment. These contrasting outcomes make sense only if it is recognized
that the Court found the speech at issue in Kingsley and Brandenburg to involve the
advocacy of ideas, whereas contrary findings were made in Roth and Feiner. Compare
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (motion
picture constitutes "advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper")
and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (speech constitutes "mere advocacy")
with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-90 (1957) (materials appealed to "prurient
interest") and Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (speaker "passe[d] the bounds
of argument or persuasion"). In other words, the speech involved in Kingsley and
Brandenburg was found not to have the quality of evoking an automatic, undeliberated
response from its hearers: rather, it was found to lie within the bounds of deliberative
discussion. The Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment rights makes the same distinc-
tion as was drawn by the Kingsley and Brandenburg Courts. By the terms of that theory
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 308, 1979
hibited on a sufficient showing of harm.59 This pattern of holdings
suggests that the Court employs the Meiklejohnian theory of First
Amendment rights as a general principle for determining the bound-
aries of protected speech.
Given the Court's acceptance of the Meiklejohnian theory, it is
plain that the indicia of nonprotection identified earlier are indeed
the salient characteristics that led the Court to its holdings in Chap-
linsky, Feiner, and the obscenity cases. Further, it is clear that in con-
trast to those holdings, the Meiklejohnian theory addresses not simply
a particular category of speech, but rather speech in general: according
to the theory, the protection of all speech must be justified by reference
to its contribution to the process of self-government. Consequently, the
Meiklejohnian theory, as accepted by the Supreme Court, properly
applies to any category of speech-such as group vilification-that ex-
hibits the indicia of nonprotection.
C. Protected Subcategories of Group Vilification
Group vilification, as defined above, can by-pass the conscious facul-
ties of its hearers, and can cause serious harm to substantial public
speech is not rendered unprotected merely on a showing of harmful effect: rather, speech
must also be shown to avoid the arena of discussion and debate by evading the conscious
faculties of its hearers.
59. "Commercial" speech is an example of such a category. When the sole attribute of
speech is a commercial message, it is normally protected by the First Amendment.
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-65
(1976). But where such speech is "untruthful," or even "only deceptive and misleading,"
there is "no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with [the] problem." Id. at 771 &
n.24. And when commercial speech possesses the additional attribute of addressing ques-
tions of general public concern, it enjoys complete protection. First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). This pattern of outcomes clearly reflects an acceptance
by the Court of the Meiklejohnian theory. Ordinary commercial speech does not con-
tribute to the deliberative process of public decisionmaking, and is thus protected only
because it does not pose any "serious harm." When such speech does threaten serious
harm, as when it is untruthful or even merely deceptive, it is unprotected, because it
then displays both indicia of nonprotection. And when commercial speech addresses
questions of general public concern, it must be protected just like any other speech that
offers ideas for public discussion and deliberation.
"Symbolic" speech furnishes another example of this pattern of outcomes. Recent
Supreme Court holdings in cases involving symbolic speech suggest that such speech is
absolutely protected. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). But an essential characteristic of symbolic
speech as thus protected is that by definition it poses no serious harm to substantial
public interests. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971) (rejecting argument that
appellant's expression could cause harm analogous to that described in Roth, Chaplinsky,
and Feiner); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (observing that appellees had no reason "to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities"). Because symbolic speech by definition can-
not display the "substantial harm" indicium of nonprotection, the Meiklejohnian theory




interests. Thus group-vilifying speech can exhibit both of the indicia of
nonprotection. But further consideration of the Meiklejohnian theory
of First Amendment rights requires the conclusion that certain sub-
categories of group vilification ought not to be prohibited even though
they do exhibit the two indicia of nonprotection.
For example, group vilification can consist of speech that constitutes
true statements of fact. 0 Although the dissemination of true state-
ments of fact regarding a racial, ethnic, or religious group could have
the effects of group-vilifying speech, 61 it is clear that under the Meikle-
johnian theory there is no information that self-determining citizens
need more acutely than true statements about the world around them.62
Therefore that theory cannot coherently exclude any true statement of
fact from the area of protected speech. 63 Accordingly, true statements of
fact constitutes one subcategory of group vilification that cannot be
prohibited. 4
Similar considerations require the protection of another subcategory
of group-vilifying speech: "simple statements of opinion."6' 5 Some
verbal statements do nothing more than express the views of the
speaker, and are so vague or general that their truth or falsity cannot
be objectively ascertained. 6 Such statements, by definition, cannot be
60. A "statement of fact" is a statement the truth or falsity of which can be objectively
determined. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 566, Comment a (1977). If the burden
of proving falsity is placed on the prosecution, then a statement of fact is "true" if it has
not been proved false beyond a reasonable doubt.
61. For example, verifiably accurate crime statistics could show that members of a
particular racial, ethnic, or religious group commit certain crimes more frequently 'than
average. Dissemination of such statistics might well injure the reputation of the group
as a whole. Further, such statistics could easily be received and accepted by prejudiced
hearers in an undeliberated and irrational way, as "confirmation" of their prejudices. Cf.
G. ALLPORT, supra note 15, at 13-14 (illustrating "slippery propensity" of prejudices to
adjust themselves to facts).
62. This is so irrespective of the motives of the speaker. See 2 H. SCHOFIELD, ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY 538-42 (1921); Kelly, supra note 6, at 327.
63. Of course, this does not imply that information genuinely necessary to the national
security, and kept secret by the government in good faith, may be disseminated with
impunity by citizens who happen to acquire it. Punishment of such "speech" is justified
by a wholly different rationale, based on the inherent authority of a government to
protect the security of the nation. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 735-40 (White, J., concurring) (1971); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
64. The principle that certain verbal statements can be recognized as true statements
of fact, and therefore cannot give rise to liability for defamation, has been acknowledged
in numerous cases. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-97 (1975);
Cullison v. City of Peoria, 584 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Ariz. 1978); Brown v. Briggs, 569 S.W.2d
760, 762 (Ct. App. Mo. 1978).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, Comment b (1977) (defining simple
statements of opinion).
66. See id. §§ 565-566 (distinguishing statements of fact from expressions of opinion).
Statements of fact are defined by their particularity. See id. § 565, Comment a (describ-
ing statements of fact as "accusation[s] of a particular act or omission") (emphasis
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proved false, and therefore may have value to the self-governing citizens
whom the Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment rights seeks to
protect. 67 Accordingly, that theory necessarily mandates protection for
simple statements of opinion.6
However, two other subcategories of group vilification exist, the
speech in which need not be protected. The first of these is the sub-
category of "false statements of fact." 69 Self-governing citizens do not
need false statements of fact, as they do true ones, in order to be fully
informed regarding all issues related to their collective decisions. In-
deed, false statements of fact may well impair the process of self-govern-
ment.70 Thus the Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment rights
permits, and may require, the nonprotection of false statements of
fact.71
The second subcategory of group-vilifying speech that may be un-
protected is "mixed statements of opinion that imply false assertions of
fact." Some statements of opinion reasonably imply assertions of fact
that the hearer of the statement does not already assume.72 When such
added). By contrast, statements of opinion are defined by their lack of particularity,
which is sufficient to render them objectively nonverifiable. For example, the statement,
"X is a thief," is not specific enough to constitute a statement of fact. It could be meant
metaphorically, and even if meant literally could not in any practical sense be proved
false: in order to disprove such a statement, X would have to show that he never com-
mitted any act that comes within the common connotation of thievery. By contrast, the
statement, "X robbed Y's grocery store yesterday," possesses sufficient specificity to con-
stitute a statement of fact. Such a statement cannot plausibly be meant metaphorically,
and if meant literally could be proved false with relative ease, by showing that Y's store
was not robbed yesterday, or that X was elsewhere. See id. § 566, Comment b (distinguish-
ing between the statement of opinion, "[X] is a thief," and the statement of fact involved
in an "assertion that [X] has committed [particular] acts that come within the common
connotation of thievery").
67. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) ("Under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea.")
68. The principle that certain verbal statements can be recognized as simple state-
ments of opinion, and therefore cannot give rise to liability, has been acknowledged in
numerous defamation cases. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 455 F. Supp. 420,
424 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Sierra Breeze v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. Rptr. 914, 916-17 (Ct. App.
Cal. 1978); Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 885, 888-91 (La. 1977).
69. Acknowledgement of the principle that certain verbal statements can be recognized
as true statements of fact, which cannot give rise to liability, see note 64 supra, neces-
sarily implies that other verbal statements can be recognized as false statements of fact.
The burden of proving falsity would be placed on the prosecution. See note 60 supra.
70. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50, at 42 (false statements of fact do not further
public interests, but only private ones, and thus are within the field of legitimate potential
legislative abridgement).
71. The principle that certain verbal statements can be recognized as false statements
of fact, and therefore may give rise to liability for defamation, has been recognized in
numerous cases. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); E. W.
Scripps Co. v. Cholmondelay, 569 S.V. 2d 700, 702-03 (Ct. App. Ky. 1978).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 566, Comment b (1977) ("To say of a
person that he is a thief without explaining why, may, depending upon the circumstances,




a statement of opinion implies an assertion of fact that is true, then
the statement must be protected for the same reasons that express
statements of fact that are true are protected. But when a mixed state-
ment of opinion implies an assertion of fact that is false, the statement
need not be protected: its effect on its hearer is the same as that of a
false statement of fact, and so, like such a statement, its protection is
not required by the Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment rights. 3
III. Group Defamation Defined and Illustrated
By applying the Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment rights, it
is possible to identify a subcategory of group-vilifying speech-"group
defamation"-that lies outside the First Amendment and thus may be
constitutionally proscribed.
A. Elements of the Offense
In order to proscribe group-vilifying statements, those statements
must exhibit the two indicia of nonprotection common to the currently
acknowledged categories of unprotected speech.7 4 In addition, because
all true statements of fact and simple statements of opinion may con-
tribute to the deliberative process of public decisionmaking, no such
statements can be proscribed.75 Thus the class of group-vilifying speech
that can be prohibited without contravention of the First Amendment-
a class that will be termed "group defamation"-must have three
characteristics:
First, it must cause serious harm to substantial public interests. This
requirement can be met by showing that the speech in question, in
the context in which it was delivered, held a racial, ethnic, or religious
group or its members up to public contempt, shame, disgrace, or
obloquy, or caused the members of the target group to be shunned,
avoided, or injured in occupation.7 6
Second, the speech, in the context in which it was delivered, must
not have appealed to the conscious faculties of its hearers. This char-
acteristic, like the "prurient interest" characteristic required of ob-
73. The principle that certain verbal statements can be recognized as mixed state-
ments of opinion that imply an assertion of fact that is false, and that such statements
may give rise to liability for defamation, has been recognized in numerous cases. See, e.g.,
Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1977); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers,
Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1216-18 (Ct. App. Ind. 1978); Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879,
885-86, 888-91 (La. 1977).
74. See pp. 317-18 sup ra.
75. See pp. 822-24 suPra.
76. See Note, supra note 2, at 609 (using similar language to describe effect of the
proscribed speech-category).
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scenity, must be found by the jury to have been present in the par-
ticular speech in question.77 But again like the "prurient interest"
characteristic, this requirement can be satisfied either by showing that
the speech in question would not appeal to the conscious faculties of
the average person in the general population, 8 or by showing that it
would not appeal to the conscious faculties of the average person in a
particular subpopulation-for example, persons already prejudiced
against the target group-that was an intended or probable recipient of
the speech.
70
Finally, the speech must convey a false assertion of fact. If the speech
is in the form of a statement of fact, that statement must be false. If
the speech is in the form of a statement of opinion that reasonably
implies an assertion of fact not assumed by its hearers, that assertion
must be false.
As thus defined, group defamation is a class of speech that, pursuant
to the Meiklejohnian theory of the First Amendment currently applied
by the Supreme Court, can be prohibited without contravention of the
freedom of speech.80
77. Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (trier of fact must decide whether
work in question appeals to prurient interest). Plainly, this requirement often focuses on
the form of a statement as much as on its substance. See note 58 sura (discerning similar
focus on form in obscenity cases).
78. Cf. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1978) (approving jury instruc-
tion in obscenity case, where instruction was "to judge these materials by the standard
of the hypothetical average person in the community, . . . includ[ing] everyone [sensitive
and insensitive] in the community").
79. Cf. id. at 301-03 (approving obscenity conviction based on jury finding that ma-
terials appealed to prurient interest of "members of a deviant sexual group"); Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966) ("Where the material is designed for and primarily dis-
seminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the
prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied ... [by reference to] the mem-
bers of that group.")
80. Because of the importance attributed to speech, any statute making the dissemina-
tion of group defamation a crime must be drawn so as not to "chill" protected speech.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). Because a chilling effect on First Amend-
ment freedoms can be "generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion
to limit [the rights'] exercise," Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), the language of a group-defamation statute must avoid these
three infirmities. It must be narrowly drawn, see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522
(1972), and specific enough to make plain the kind of speech that is prohibited, see
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
Additionally, in order to "bridle" governmental discretion, certain substantive and
procedural safeguards should be provided in favor of the defendant in a group-defama-
tion prosecution. With respect to each element of the offense, the prosecution should
bear the burden of satisfying the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Further, the trial judge, rather than the jury, should
be given the responsibility of determining three matters that could arise with respect to
the offense: first, whether a statement is one of fact or opinion; second, whether a state-
ment of opinion could reasonably imply an assertion of fact not assumed by the hearer;
and third, whether a statement could cause any of the harms to the target group or its
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B. Standard for Criminal Liability
There remains the question of the degree of fault that should be
required of a group-defaming speaker in order to render him liable to
criminal sanctions for his speech. An answer is suggested by an examin-
ation of three closely related Supreme Court decisions-New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,81 Garrison v. Louisiana,8 2 and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.S8 -and by a consideration of the nature and effects of group
defamation.
In Sullivan, the Court held that in a civil action brought by a public
official for criticism of his official conduct, the constitutionally pre-
scribed minimum standard of liability is "actual malice": the de-
fendant must have published a false statement "with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'8 4
In Garrison, the Court determined that this "actual malice" standard
of fault "also limits state power to impose criminal sanctions for
criticism of the official conduct of public officials."8 15
In Gertz, however, the Court held that "so long as they do not im-
pose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of de-
famatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."8 6 In other words,
Gertz held that a state may permit a private individual who sues for
libel to succeed on a showing of the defendant's negligence, without
being required to prove the higher degree of fault known as "actual
malice."s7
Inspection of the Gertz opinion, combined with an examination of
the characteristics of group defamation, shows that the proper standard
members deemed requisite to satisfy the "serious harm" element of the offense. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 614, 617 (1977) (proposing similar allocation of func-
tions between court and jury). The determination of all other matters pertaining to the
elements of the offense should be left to the jury. Id. This allocation of the burden of
proof and the trial functions of judge and jury would minimize the incidence of im-
proper convictions under the statute.
81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
82. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
83. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
84. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
85. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) (emphasis added). The adoption of
the "actual malice" standard had a dramatic effect on the ability of plaintiffs to succeed
in defamation suits. By 1971, the burden of proof imposed on such plaintiffs was so
heavy that it "became virtually impossible to overcome." Frakt, The Evolving Law of
Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond,
6 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 471, 477 (1975). The "overwhelming majority of plaintiffs" thus "failed
to meet the requirement." Id. at 478 & nn.44 & 45.
86. 418 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
87. See id. at 375-76 (White, J., dissenting).
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for imposing liability in group-defamation prosecutions is negligence.
The Gertz Court gave two reasons for permitting a lower standard of
fault in suits involving private individuals. Both reasons pertained to
distinctions the Court saw between private individuals and public
figures. First, the Court observed that public figures, because of their
"significantly greater access to the channels of effective communica-
tion ...have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false state-
ments than private individuals normally enjoy. ' s8 Second, the Court
noted that a public figure, by "invit[ing] attention and comment, ...
relinquishe[s] . . . part of his interest in the protection of his own good
name," while "[n]o such assumption is justified with respect to a
private individual."8' 9
The Gertz Court thus rested its holding on two characteristics of the
private individual: his lesser capacity to rebut defamatory statements,
and his greater retained privacy interest. The Court viewed its allow-
ance of a lower standard of liability as striking the proper balance be-
tween the right of free speech and "the state interest in ... the reputa-
tion of private individuals." 90 Because this state interest was perceived
as greater than the state interest in the reputation of public officials
or public figures, a lower standard of liability was deemed proper.
By analogy, the state interest in the elimination of group defamation
and its harmful concomitants should be sufficient to warrant the lower
standard of liability permitted in Gertz. The state has a substantial in-
terest in protecting the reputation of defamed target groups and their
members,91 just as it has an interest in the reputation of private in-
dividuals. According to the two characteristics focused on in Gertz,
the victims of group defamation deserve protection similar to that
afforded to libeled private individuals. The nature of the appeal of
group defamation to its hearers,92 as well as the amorphous and gen-
eral nature of its content, suggests that antiprejudice propaganda will
have relatively little effect; 93 consequently, a target group and its
members have a fairly small capacity for "self-help." In addition, the
notoriety of a target group and its members is generally quite in-
voluntary: it cannot be said that the victims of group defamation
88. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 345.
90. Id. at 343.
91. See p. 314 supra.
92. See p. 313 supra.
93. See, e.g., G. SIMPSON 9- J. YINGER, supra note 17, at 668-72 (observing inability of
anti-prejudice propaganda to effect extensive changes).
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"thrust themselves" into the public eye in the manner of public officials
or public figures.
94
Thus the state interest in the reputation of defamed target groups
and their members appears comparable in nature with that held to
warrant a negligence standard of liability in Gertz. When the general
state interest in eradicating discrimination is also taken into account,
it seems proper to conclude that the standard of fault prescribed by
the Gertz Court-negligence, rather than actual malice-should prop-
erly apply in prosecutions for group defamation.
C. Group Defamation Illustrated
The intended scope and limits of the proposed prohibition of group-
defaming speech may be clarified by applying the definition developed
above to particular examples of speech.
1. William Shockley
William B. Shockley achieved national notoriety in the early 1970's
for his views on the inheritability of human intelligence. 95 Basing his
conclusions on the results of standardized intelligence tests,96 Shockley
argued that "Negro-white differences in [test scores] may be evidence
for racial genetic differences in neurological organization rather than
due to environmental differences," and suggested that, accordingly,
"[g]iving a bonus to low I.Q. groups that do not reproduce might be
worth discussion. '97 For present purposes, the following passage, as re-
ported in the New York Times, adequately represents the character of
Shockley's speech:
My research leads me inescapably to the opinion that the major
cause of American Negroes' intellectual and social deficits is
94. Of course, in some religious groups membership is plainly voluntary. If such a
religious group were to thrust itself to "the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345 (1974), then the "actual malice" standard applicable to public figures would
more properly apply. Cf. Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 455 F. Supp. 420, 423 (M.D. Fla.
1978) (holding plaintiff religious organization to be a public figure, and thus to be
required to prove actual malice).
95. Shockley was then a Professor of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University. In
1972 he was denied permission to teach for credit a course on his theory of intelligence.
One reason given for this denial was that Shockley was not qualified to teach such a
course. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1972, at 9, col. 1.
96. See id., Dec. 5, 1973, at 38, col. 2 (acknowledging that Shockley's views were based
on results of standardized intelligence tests); id., Oct. 28, 1973, § 4, at 7, col. 4 (advertise-
ment by Committee Against Racism; same).
97. Id., May 3, 1970, § I, at 58, col. 4 (bracketed words in original).
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hereditary and . . . racially genetic in origin and thus not re-
mediable to a major degree by practical improvement in environ-
ment.
[It might be necessary to sterilize persons of very low intelligence
to avoid] retrogressive evolution through the disproportionate re-
production of the genetically disadvantaged. 98
Shockley's speech might well be described as group vilification. If
believed, such speech could easily have injured the reputation of blacks
as a group, harming both the group and its individual members. More-
over, racially prejudiced hearers of Shockley's speech could have re-
ceived and accepted it in an undeliberated, irrational way, as scientific
confirmation of their prejudices.
Nevertheless, Shockley's speech was not group defamation as that
term is defined above. The quoted passage is a "simple statement of
opinion": 99 Shockley stated the facts on which he based his opinion-
namely, racial differences in intelligence-test scores-and then expressed
a comment as to the character of fhe target group and the implications
of that character for future public policy. 100 The statements of fact on
which Shockley based his opinion were recognized as true. 1 1 Because
Shockley's speech involved neither false statements of fact nor mixed
statements of opinion, it would not and could not constitute group
defamation.
1 02
2. The Nazis in Skokie
In March 1977 the National Socialist Party of America announced
plans to conduct a public demonstration in Skokie, Illinois. 10 3 As a
98. Id., Dec. 5, 1973, at 38, col. 2, 3 (bracketed words in original).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, Comment b & Comment c, Illustration
4 (1977) (defining and illustrating "simple" expressions of opinion).
100. Shockley's statement that "the major cause of American Negroes' intellectual and
social deficits is hereditary," is not a statement of fact, because its truth or falsity cannot
be ascertained. See notes 60, 66 supra. Therefore the statement must be one of opinion.
101. Shockley's critics conceded that whites as a group scored higher than blacks as a
group on traditional standardized intelligence tests. These critics disagreed with Shockley
only as to the inferences that could properly be drawn from the fact of these differential
scores. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1973, at 38, col. 3; id., Nov. 21, 1973, at 41, col. 3; id., Oct.
28, 1973, § 4, at 7, col. 4 (advertisement by Committee Against Racism).
102. See pp. 322-24 supra (explaining that simple statements of opinion must be pro-
tected under Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment rights).
103. See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 Ii. App. 3d 279,
282, 366 N.E.2d 347, 349-50 (1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 69 Il1. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d
21 (1978) (describing events leading to litigation).
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prelude to the planned demonstration, the Party circulated a leaflet
entitled "We Are Coming,"' 0 4 which read in part:
An old maxim goes: "Where one finds the most Jews, there also
shall one find the most Jew-haters." With this basic truth in mind,
we are now planning a number of street demonstrations and even
speeches in Evanston, Skokie, Lincolnwood, North Shore, Morton
Grove, etc. This leaflet is but the first of a number now being
prepared for eventual mass-distribution. A beautiful, full-color
poster, 18 inches by 30 inches, with non-removable adhesive on
the back, is already in the works. The poster shows three rabbis
involved in the ritual murder of an innocent Gentile boy during
the hate-fest of Purim. Our propaganda will deal at large with
expos6 after expos6 of the Talmud, the Protocols of Zion and
revealing quotes, many never before presented anywhere from
loose-lipped Hebes .... 105
This passage refers to two publications that could fall into the cate-
gory of group defamation: the poster of the three rabbis, and the "ex-
pos6" known as the Protocols of Zion.106 Given the proper proofs,
publication of both the poster and the Protocols would be prohibited
under the analysis of this Note, and that prohibition would not con-
travene the First Amendment.
The "expos6" known as the Protocols of Zion consists of assertions
that are both specific and objectively verifiable; it is therefore a state-
ment of fact, and subject as such to being proved false.'07 According
to the proposal of this Note, if the trier of fact were satisfied that the
Protocols was false, and if the trier were further satisfied that the state-
ment referred to Jews as a group, caused them harm, and did not ap-
104. Letter from Harvey Schwartz, supra note 2.
105. Id. (enclosure).
106. The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion is a fraudulent document that has
served as a pretext and rationale for anti-Semitism. The document purports to be a report
of a series of meetings held in Basel, Switzerland, at the time of the first Zionist con-
gress. There Jews and Freemasons were said to have made plans to disrupt Christian
civilization and erect a world state under their joint rule. Liberalism and socialism were
to be the means of subverting Christendom; if subversion failed, all the capitals of
Europe were to be sabotaged. 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (MICROPAEDIA) 253 (1974).
The Protocols were first printed in Russia in 1903. They were soon translated into
other languages and became a classic of anti-Semitic literature. In the United States,
Henry Ford's private newspaper, the Dearborn Independent, often cited them as evidence
of a Jewish threat. Their spurious character was first revealed in 1921 by Philip Graves
of the London Times, who demonstrated their obvious resemblance to a satire by the
French lawyer Maurice Joly on Napoleon III, published in 1864. Subsequent investigation,
particularly by the Russian historian Vladimir Burtsev, revealed that the Protocols were
forgeries compounded by officials of the Russian secret police out of the satire of Joly, a
fantastic novel by Hermann Goedsche in 1868, and other sources. Id.
107. Indeed, the Protocols have already been conclusively shown to be false. See id.
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peal to the conscious faculties of its hearers, then the Protocols could
be constitutionally prohibited as group defamation.
The poster, by contrast, is a symbolic, impressionistic representation
of an event. Lacking specificity, its message is incapable of being proved
true or false, and thus constitutes a statement of opinion. But because
it is described as depicting a "ritual" murder, the poster may reason-
ably be taken as implying that the event that it portrays in fact occurs,
and occurs regularly. This implied statement of fact-"Rabbis regular-
ly murder innocent Gentile boys at the festival of Purim"-is suscep-
tible to verification.' 08 Under the proposal of this Note, if the trier of
fact were satisfied that the statement of fact reasonably inferred from
the poster is false, and if the trier were further satisfied that the state-
ment referred to Jews as a group, caused them harm, and did not ap-
peal to the conscious faculties of its viewers, then the poster could
be constitutionally prohibited as group defamation.10 9
Conclusion
Currently, all group-libeling speech is widely viewed as protected by
the First Amendment. But that view is simplistic and incorrect. It fails
to take into account the psychological effects of prejudice; conse-
quently, it applies the "marketplace of ideas" justification for freedom
of speech" x0 to group vilification, which trades not in ideas but in
pernicious and undeliberated passions. A more realistic assessment of
the nature of group-vilifying speech, combined with an appreciation
of the proper and recognized purposes of the First Amendment, leads
to the conclusion that certain kinds of group vilification can be pro-
hibited. Such a prohibition would not violate, but would rather ful-
fill, the ideal of deliberative self-government that underlies the First
Amendment.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 566, Comment b & Comment c, Illustration
3 (1977) (defining and illustrating "mixed" expressions of opinion).
109. See pp. 324-25 supra (explaining that false statements of fact, and statements of
opinion that reasonably imply false assertions of fact not assumed by the hearer, need not
be protected under Meiklejohnian theory of First Amendment rights). With respect to the
definitional and procedural checks on improper conviction, see note 80 supra.
110. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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